A grain of sand

It has taken me a while to react on the disappointing state of the nation address of President Medvedev, and the reason is that for a long time I hadn't quite gotten the idea behind it. As we all remember, the whole story about the speech started out quite promisingly. There were plenty of opportunities for Medvedev to make a giant leap towards his second term. First, there were speculations about a planned reorganisation of Russia's federal subjects that would have created the geographical prerequisite for modernisation. Then, there was this carefully built up notion about a gradual political modernisation of Russia. It started in Yaroslavl then continued with the "projections" of Vladislav Surkov about the backlash of United Russia, which was echoed - albeit in a more cautious manner - by Medvedev himself (and seemingly embraced by the party as well). Then, by a sudden turn of events, the President deems it more important to speak about children's rights (besides the usual mantra). Maybe he simply had too much to talk about?

Getting from four to five

One of the most interesting statements of last week was that of the vice-chair of the President's administration, Vladislav Surkov, also known as the grey cardinal of the Kremlin. Speaking to American students, Surkov stated that United Russia has an "abnormally high" rating and that in the next few years the party will become weaker while opposition parties gain strength. Surkov went so far as to claim that in 10 years the number of parties in the State Duma will rise from the present four to five. Should anyone else say similar things, I would dismiss it as a mumbo jumbo with no adequate scientific background whatsoever. But we are in Russia, and Surkov is the main engineer of the Russian party system. So, if he makes such remarks, we might as well take them for granted. But what exactly is the goal of these changes and whose goal is it, anyway?

Potemstroika

I completely agree with the thoughts of Ivan Rodin published in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta about the PR-stunt of Dmitry Medvedev, or, more specifically, his team. For those who do not know about it: the Russian President vetoed a law that would have banned people already undergoing proceedings for disorderly behaviour from organising protest rallies. This was Medvedev's third veto overall, and the first "real" one, given that the first two was put on laws containing technical problems or wording mistakes. One thing is undoubtedly clear about this story: it is not about the freedom of assembly or the rights of the opposition. The State Duma is most likely to change the wording of the law a tiny bit and then to send it back to the President. If not, Russia's government will still have plenty of tools in its hands to supress voices criticising the system too loudly. Period. However, the whole media attention surrounding the veto, the fact that this is one in a recent series of similar measures and the obscurity around the veto's birth make this usual PR-stunt a very interesting thing to observe. 

Equal opportunities

Two quite strange and surprising news items hit the internet last week. The first was about the odd "injury" of Vladimir Putin, seen during his trip to Ukraine, which was described by official sources as a symptom of jet lag and exhaustion. Jet lag would of course be understandable, but "exhaustion" is a very weak explanation in the case of a man who has long since been styled and shown as the toughest guy in Russia. I doubt we find out someday what exactly was behind that mark, but let's dwell on that later. The other thing did not get this much media attention. According to Levada Center, the approval ratings of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, for the first time in history, equalled. Does it mean the beginning of something new? I doubt so. Only on the surface, maybe.

Modernisation, actually

This certainly began earlier, but the sacking of Yuri Luzhkov again directed the attention to the state and the future role of the United Russia party. The Moscow branch of the party was the only political organisation that openly supported Luzhkov, contrary to the silence of the central bodies of the party and notably Vladimir Putin. The subsequent appointment of Sergey Sobyanin to the head of the capital raised the question whether a mini-tandem would be needed to consolidate the Moscow branch. RFE/RL went as far as suggesting these mini-tandems would lead every single region of the country. This suggestion, as plausible as it sounds, raises some question marks. Maybe the leaders of Russia are trying to kill two birds with one stone?

How to fix a crack

Quite understandably, there has been a lot of hype around the replacement of Yuri Luzhkov. United Russia announced the list of candidates on 11 October. That means that Dmitry Medvedev will choose one of them by Monday. Or will it be one? Brian Whitmore on RFE/RL convincingly argues that the ruling tandem is about to reproduce the same structure in the capital, putting an "executive" premier under the future mayor. I cannot but agree with the obious benefits of a structure like that, and I must also take note of the very cautious approach Russian leaders have been handling this problem with. However, I have some reservations about the lineup the article suggests.

Covering up

A former diplomat, one who knows Russia and its leaders quite well (I should refrain from mentioning him by name) told something very interesting and, to be honest, quite obvious (if you look at it that way) recently in Brussels. He drew my attention to the fact that Russian leaders are not completely dumb: they are fully aware that Dmitry Medvedev's top-down approach to modernisation won't make any tangible difference. The reason why they're doing this, the diplomat said, is that they want to cover something up. Something bigger, or the lack thereof. 

Dima's last chance

Bang! The news about the sudden and arbitrary dismissal of Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov came today as a lightning struck – to everyone that had not been following Russian politics in the last few years. In fact, this step was so exactly predicted by political commentators and Kremlinologists throughout the planet, that one might even have a slight suspicion that the tech-savvy Dmitry Medvedev took his decision after reading numerous blog entries predicting that the autumn of 2010 was indeed the last opportunity for the President to fire this political Methuselah. Whichever way Medvedev took his decision this also marks the beginning of the 2012 showdown. Luzhkov, commonly referred to as the “third man” in Russia after Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, will leave a complicated legacy to deal with.