Putin's pillars

We're edging closer to the 4th of March, and accordingly, the picture has started to be clearer about the strategy of the ruling elite for the very day of the election. However, what will happen after remains a big question mark to many - not only us Russia-watchers, but, I dare to say, to many in the Kremlin as well. The events of the last few months seem to have excluded the possibility of an intentionally harsh crackdown but at the same time, a two-round scenario also seems to be less and less likely. While there is a certain logic behind Putin's apparent intention to bury his head in the sand and to proceed as usual, this may after all send the wrong signal to the elite and certainly to the population. Putin surely thinks that he chose the safer strategy, but this might as well turn out to be the riskier one. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

A new pluralism

There you have it. As I blogged last week, Dmitry Medvedev seems to have moved towards the reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections. At least, this is what the President's latest statements suggest. Also, the effective removal of Valentina Matvienko from the position of St. Petersburg governor seems to confirm the idea that a thorough (if only virtual) revamp of the system of the regional administration is planned. Matviyenko's dismissal has been cooking for some time now (for the exact same reasons as in the case of Yuriy Luzhkov and Georgy Boos), but she was apparently more clever than the former Moscow mayor, and - after some "waffling" - accepted a position that is officially higher than her previous one (and which, without any doubts, has been offered to Luzhkov as well). There are still a lot of questions unanswered - including that of the person who will take over Matvienko's seat in August - but the way that Medvedev seems to be going is clear, and this can only indicate that the President is slowly but surely forming his electoral programme.

Genius loci

After a long pre-summer recess, I finally have the time to react on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and especially on the speech given by Dmitry Medvedev. The President's intervention lasted slightly more than 30 minutes, contrary to the much hyped press conference in May that stretched on for more than 2 hours. Yet, I dare to say, this speech was the strongest indication so far that Medvedev wants to retain power and he is willing to give the ruling elite tangible reasons why he should be the candidate next year. It was also an important contribution to the debate about the the revamp of the Russian political and economic system, a notion that Medvedev pretty much seems to have embarked on and will make it the core of his campaign. In the following paragraphs, I'll try to argue why the St. Petersburg speech had a considerable significance in view of the forthcoming elections and what it has to do with some other exciting analytic material Russia-watchers could lay their hands on during the last couple of weeks. 

Modernisation, actually

This certainly began earlier, but the sacking of Yuri Luzhkov again directed the attention to the state and the future role of the United Russia party. The Moscow branch of the party was the only political organisation that openly supported Luzhkov, contrary to the silence of the central bodies of the party and notably Vladimir Putin. The subsequent appointment of Sergey Sobyanin to the head of the capital raised the question whether a mini-tandem would be needed to consolidate the Moscow branch. RFE/RL went as far as suggesting these mini-tandems would lead every single region of the country. This suggestion, as plausible as it sounds, raises some question marks. Maybe the leaders of Russia are trying to kill two birds with one stone?

How to fix a crack

Quite understandably, there has been a lot of hype around the replacement of Yuri Luzhkov. United Russia announced the list of candidates on 11 October. That means that Dmitry Medvedev will choose one of them by Monday. Or will it be one? Brian Whitmore on RFE/RL convincingly argues that the ruling tandem is about to reproduce the same structure in the capital, putting an "executive" premier under the future mayor. I cannot but agree with the obious benefits of a structure like that, and I must also take note of the very cautious approach Russian leaders have been handling this problem with. However, I have some reservations about the lineup the article suggests.

Dima's last chance

Bang! The news about the sudden and arbitrary dismissal of Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov came today as a lightning struck – to everyone that had not been following Russian politics in the last few years. In fact, this step was so exactly predicted by political commentators and Kremlinologists throughout the planet, that one might even have a slight suspicion that the tech-savvy Dmitry Medvedev took his decision after reading numerous blog entries predicting that the autumn of 2010 was indeed the last opportunity for the President to fire this political Methuselah. Whichever way Medvedev took his decision this also marks the beginning of the 2012 showdown. Luzhkov, commonly referred to as the “third man” in Russia after Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, will leave a complicated legacy to deal with.