The Putin Defence

Obviously, the biggest question when it comes to the new power structure in Russia will be about the handling of inevitable personal clashes. As I've blogged before, Vladimir Putin will have to solve a double task: he will have to ensure stability for the elite that takes stability for the preservation of the monolithic power structures, while at the same time ensuring stability for the population that takes stability for the return of stable growth. As a third factor, Putin will also have to deal with those who want change, and who may as well be more powerful than Putin has anticipated. Especially now that we're closing in on regional elections. I suppose that Putin will try to put in place a system where, in the short term, he will be trying to keep heavyweights out of the frontline and push a semblance of changes to the foreground. This might allow him to buy precious time, but it won't be near enough to preserve a system which is more and more decaying from below. 

Changing horses

Vladislav Surkov's departure from the Kremlin has shocked many. After all, the grey cardinal has occupied the post of deputy chief of staff in charge for political engineering practically for ever (1999, to be exact). However, there had been some signs of his imminent departure (Kevin Rothrock spotted some), and while it undoubtedly signals the end of an era (just like Aleksey Kudrin's resignation did), it does not necessarily mean the end of Surkov's importance in Russia's political system. Positions change, roles do so more rarely, and I don't think that the influence of the grey cardinal will undoubtedly fade with this demotion. His future path will depend on the political constellation after the reshuffle (including Putin's return) has been fully finished. 

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

Walk-ons walk off, the stage is prepared!

There you go, I could blog now, there you have it. After all, I wasn't so much wrong comparing Mikhail Prokhorov and his party to A Just Russia in 2006. They both had Evgeny Roizman, and the party in both cases went mad upon the nomination of Roizman. Both leaders suffered a humiliating demise orchestrated by the Kremlin as soon as their activities became too bold for the ruling elite. Even the columnist of Kommersant realised the apparent parallelism between the two cases I pointed out a month ago, which put light on a much greater issue. It is not sure any more whether the chief ideological workshop headed by Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin can handle Russian politics as effectively as it used to. Still, paradoxically, this emerging struggle within the ruling elite, which is far from being any striking news, may eventually lead to a more daring liberalisation of Russian politics. 

All roads lead to the Third Rome

Is there really something happening in Russia, or are we only made to believe that? I think this is the main question that has been emerging in this election year of 2011, with a lot of arguments on both sides. On the surface, apparently, a lot of things change. Sergey Storchak is freed, the Khodorkovsky case may be revisited, and finance minister Aleksey Kudrin seems to have opened Pandora's box with his recent calling for a real political reform. Now other economists follow the lead, continuing the line started by Vladislav Surkov last year and interrupted by the "safety speech" of Dmitry Medvedev in December. Some argue that Medvedev slowly but surely started to take over the leadership in the tandem, pointing at the steadily decreasing number of siloviki in the state administration. Others say that we are witnessing a farce, the only goal of which is to maintain some kind of tension in Russian politics, so that Putin can embark on his "Plan B" if things start to get out of hands. 

A grain of sand

It has taken me a while to react on the disappointing state of the nation address of President Medvedev, and the reason is that for a long time I hadn't quite gotten the idea behind it. As we all remember, the whole story about the speech started out quite promisingly. There were plenty of opportunities for Medvedev to make a giant leap towards his second term. First, there were speculations about a planned reorganisation of Russia's federal subjects that would have created the geographical prerequisite for modernisation. Then, there was this carefully built up notion about a gradual political modernisation of Russia. It started in Yaroslavl then continued with the "projections" of Vladislav Surkov about the backlash of United Russia, which was echoed - albeit in a more cautious manner - by Medvedev himself (and seemingly embraced by the party as well). Then, by a sudden turn of events, the President deems it more important to speak about children's rights (besides the usual mantra). Maybe he simply had too much to talk about?

Getting from four to five

One of the most interesting statements of last week was that of the vice-chair of the President's administration, Vladislav Surkov, also known as the grey cardinal of the Kremlin. Speaking to American students, Surkov stated that United Russia has an "abnormally high" rating and that in the next few years the party will become weaker while opposition parties gain strength. Surkov went so far as to claim that in 10 years the number of parties in the State Duma will rise from the present four to five. Should anyone else say similar things, I would dismiss it as a mumbo jumbo with no adequate scientific background whatsoever. But we are in Russia, and Surkov is the main engineer of the Russian party system. So, if he makes such remarks, we might as well take them for granted. But what exactly is the goal of these changes and whose goal is it, anyway?

Potemstroika

I completely agree with the thoughts of Ivan Rodin published in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta about the PR-stunt of Dmitry Medvedev, or, more specifically, his team. For those who do not know about it: the Russian President vetoed a law that would have banned people already undergoing proceedings for disorderly behaviour from organising protest rallies. This was Medvedev's third veto overall, and the first "real" one, given that the first two was put on laws containing technical problems or wording mistakes. One thing is undoubtedly clear about this story: it is not about the freedom of assembly or the rights of the opposition. The State Duma is most likely to change the wording of the law a tiny bit and then to send it back to the President. If not, Russia's government will still have plenty of tools in its hands to supress voices criticising the system too loudly. Period. However, the whole media attention surrounding the veto, the fact that this is one in a recent series of similar measures and the obscurity around the veto's birth make this usual PR-stunt a very interesting thing to observe.