The Putin Defence

Obviously, the biggest question when it comes to the new power structure in Russia will be about the handling of inevitable personal clashes. As I've blogged before, Vladimir Putin will have to solve a double task: he will have to ensure stability for the elite that takes stability for the preservation of the monolithic power structures, while at the same time ensuring stability for the population that takes stability for the return of stable growth. As a third factor, Putin will also have to deal with those who want change, and who may as well be more powerful than Putin has anticipated. Especially now that we're closing in on regional elections. I suppose that Putin will try to put in place a system where, in the short term, he will be trying to keep heavyweights out of the frontline and push a semblance of changes to the foreground. This might allow him to buy precious time, but it won't be near enough to preserve a system which is more and more decaying from below. 

Back to the future

It might seem as if the game had ended - at least this is what Novaya Gazeta proclaimed on its front page this week. In fact, the "game" has only just begun with last Sunday's victory of Putin. I believe that in a way Putin's third term will be more reminiscent to Medvedev's intermezzo than to Putin's first two presidential mandates. The elected president may have cleared an important checkpoint - smoother than many had expected - but he still has to face a more important, and tougher challenge: dismantling and redesigning a system he created, while avoiding potential loss of trust from either side of the elite. Thus, he has to create a new power balance, a new machinery and a new way of deliberation to run the state, a new popular platform and he has to do it so to be able to conduct the necessary economic and political reforms as efficiently as possible. The mortar of the system has already been eroded by the unorthodox circumstances under Medvedev, and the next couple of months will be decisive from the point of view of laying out the blueprint for a new, stable, but more flexible construction. But how will this look like?

Putin's pillars

We're edging closer to the 4th of March, and accordingly, the picture has started to be clearer about the strategy of the ruling elite for the very day of the election. However, what will happen after remains a big question mark to many - not only us Russia-watchers, but, I dare to say, to many in the Kremlin as well. The events of the last few months seem to have excluded the possibility of an intentionally harsh crackdown but at the same time, a two-round scenario also seems to be less and less likely. While there is a certain logic behind Putin's apparent intention to bury his head in the sand and to proceed as usual, this may after all send the wrong signal to the elite and certainly to the population. Putin surely thinks that he chose the safer strategy, but this might as well turn out to be the riskier one. 

Changing horses

Vladislav Surkov's departure from the Kremlin has shocked many. After all, the grey cardinal has occupied the post of deputy chief of staff in charge for political engineering practically for ever (1999, to be exact). However, there had been some signs of his imminent departure (Kevin Rothrock spotted some), and while it undoubtedly signals the end of an era (just like Aleksey Kudrin's resignation did), it does not necessarily mean the end of Surkov's importance in Russia's political system. Positions change, roles do so more rarely, and I don't think that the influence of the grey cardinal will undoubtedly fade with this demotion. His future path will depend on the political constellation after the reshuffle (including Putin's return) has been fully finished. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

Who needs a punchline?

I was really surprised to see how many journalists and Russia-watchers said that Wednesday's press conference in Skolkovo had turned out to be a disappointment. To me it was not the least bit disappointing. On the contrary, it was damn interesting to watch. Oh, sorry: did anyone really expect a big announcement? I hope not. As Medvedev rightly put it, the time is not ripe yet. Moreover, clearly, Medvedev cannot announce his candidacy before a capable political force announces that it would support it. And this way, the President's candidacy might as well be announced by the All-Russia People's Front, even if Medvedev again used the word "Я" repeatedly in his sentence when asked about the big announcement. Meanwhile, he did drop quite a few interesting sentences about "the next government", Mikhail Hodorkovsky, or the demise of Sergey Mironov. On the other hand, he didn't touch on the new leader of the Right Cause party, Mikhail Prokhorov. Was this then an act of surrendering or further window-dressing?

Nothing new under the Sun

The title may seem surprising. There has indeed been a lot of news recently in Russian politics, so much that it got a considerable part of us Russia-watchers confused. Gleb Pavlovsky quit, Medvedev started to replace officials on the boards of state-owned companies, a massive reorganisation has taken place in the police, the President started a legislative upsurge against corruption, a real chance emerged to revisit the case of Sergey Magnitsky, and, most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a wide political alliance of parties, people and civil organisations who are ready to rally around United Russia. Some, including the very respectable Gordon Hahn on ROPV, suggest that this may be the sign of a real rupture on the highest levels of the ruling tandem. I agree with most of his points, but when it comes to drawing conclusions, we differ. I don't think this is the beginning of an open war at the top. Here is why.

They want change

Changes in Russian politics seem to have gained momentum in March. Things follow each other in a remarkable pace, public dispute about Libya followed by the massive sacking of government officials from the boards of state-owned companies and Dmitry Medvedev's most straightforward ever indication about his running for presidency in 2012. Even well-informed Russian political commentators are scratching their heads clueless, while the only consensus seems to be on the fact that something is really happening (which, by the way, should come as no surprise, given that 2011 is an election year). Obviously, I won't try to do justice from Brussels, but I will add what I think about the whole story, and what I think may be in stock for us. So is this one a real conflict, and what seem to be the strategies of the conflicting (or the cooperating) parties?

Us and them

In politics there are two things which can clearly indicate that an issue is very important. It's either that the elite talks way too much about it or that it keeps completely silent. The control over Russia's geopolitical orientation was something that hadn't been questioned for years and now it seems to face a long and fierce discussion. Some suggest that this stint between Medvedev and Putin is something that hadn't been seen earlier and that it is the first "real" dispute within the tandem. Some even see the end of the "dynamic duo". I don't think that the week that passed since the conflicting statements has lived up to the expectations of those who wanted to see an open rivalry. On the other hand, given the oddity of a public confrontation like this in an election year, I am sure something is going on and it is more than the usual pokazukha. Still, in Russia, these things can only be planned. But who planned this one, and what is the point?

Divide et impera

Many noticed how the finance minister Aleksey Kudrin has become an interesting figure of Russian politics recently. I myself have blogged about him earlier, voicing my opinion that Kudrin might be the public face of Kremlin-style liberalisation in an attempt to safely link the "civiliki" to Putin. Now that Kudrin again voiced the need for political liberalisation at another investment forum this week, Brian Whitmore suggests that Kudrin may step into public politics as a leader of the Right Cause party. Speculations about this have been around for a while, so there is definitely something planned. Such an enigmatic person as Kudrin will probably not become, all of a sudden, a loose cannon. If it's planned though, it seems to confirm my earlier theory about the integration of the liberals under the leadership of a strong ally of Putin. But what does it mean for Putin, Medvedev and most of all, Kudrin?

At crossroads

Last Sunday Russia had its last electoral test before this year's parliamentary vote, and these elections again brought some useful lessons for the governing elite. As I have argued earlier, these local votes are, more or less, always set as tests for a certain policy, governmental philosophy or future goal. I think this one was designed to show whether United Russia has the strength to maintain its lead in the State Duma in December without serious electoral fraud. Rampant rigging of the Duma election is unlikely, for it is also undesirable for the Russian elite. Most importantly because it would contradict the slow political liberalisation that the tandem and some liberals in the government seem to have embarked upon. A considerable deviation from this policy would probably mean an uncontrollable strengthening of liberals (both inside and outside the government). A third problem would be the disapproval of the West, which Russia traditionally does not care about, but which would also be problematic in view of the recent thaw in international relations. So, United Russia had to face a test, and it failed. And, oddly enough, this may hurt Medvedev more than Putin. What exactly do the results teach us? 

All roads lead to the Third Rome

Is there really something happening in Russia, or are we only made to believe that? I think this is the main question that has been emerging in this election year of 2011, with a lot of arguments on both sides. On the surface, apparently, a lot of things change. Sergey Storchak is freed, the Khodorkovsky case may be revisited, and finance minister Aleksey Kudrin seems to have opened Pandora's box with his recent calling for a real political reform. Now other economists follow the lead, continuing the line started by Vladislav Surkov last year and interrupted by the "safety speech" of Dmitry Medvedev in December. Some argue that Medvedev slowly but surely started to take over the leadership in the tandem, pointing at the steadily decreasing number of siloviki in the state administration. Others say that we are witnessing a farce, the only goal of which is to maintain some kind of tension in Russian politics, so that Putin can embark on his "Plan B" if things start to get out of hands. 

A grain of sand

It has taken me a while to react on the disappointing state of the nation address of President Medvedev, and the reason is that for a long time I hadn't quite gotten the idea behind it. As we all remember, the whole story about the speech started out quite promisingly. There were plenty of opportunities for Medvedev to make a giant leap towards his second term. First, there were speculations about a planned reorganisation of Russia's federal subjects that would have created the geographical prerequisite for modernisation. Then, there was this carefully built up notion about a gradual political modernisation of Russia. It started in Yaroslavl then continued with the "projections" of Vladislav Surkov about the backlash of United Russia, which was echoed - albeit in a more cautious manner - by Medvedev himself (and seemingly embraced by the party as well). Then, by a sudden turn of events, the President deems it more important to speak about children's rights (besides the usual mantra). Maybe he simply had too much to talk about?

Potemstroika

I completely agree with the thoughts of Ivan Rodin published in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta about the PR-stunt of Dmitry Medvedev, or, more specifically, his team. For those who do not know about it: the Russian President vetoed a law that would have banned people already undergoing proceedings for disorderly behaviour from organising protest rallies. This was Medvedev's third veto overall, and the first "real" one, given that the first two was put on laws containing technical problems or wording mistakes. One thing is undoubtedly clear about this story: it is not about the freedom of assembly or the rights of the opposition. The State Duma is most likely to change the wording of the law a tiny bit and then to send it back to the President. If not, Russia's government will still have plenty of tools in its hands to supress voices criticising the system too loudly. Period. However, the whole media attention surrounding the veto, the fact that this is one in a recent series of similar measures and the obscurity around the veto's birth make this usual PR-stunt a very interesting thing to observe. 

Equal opportunities

Two quite strange and surprising news items hit the internet last week. The first was about the odd "injury" of Vladimir Putin, seen during his trip to Ukraine, which was described by official sources as a symptom of jet lag and exhaustion. Jet lag would of course be understandable, but "exhaustion" is a very weak explanation in the case of a man who has long since been styled and shown as the toughest guy in Russia. I doubt we find out someday what exactly was behind that mark, but let's dwell on that later. The other thing did not get this much media attention. According to Levada Center, the approval ratings of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, for the first time in history, equalled. Does it mean the beginning of something new? I doubt so. Only on the surface, maybe.

Modernisation, actually

This certainly began earlier, but the sacking of Yuri Luzhkov again directed the attention to the state and the future role of the United Russia party. The Moscow branch of the party was the only political organisation that openly supported Luzhkov, contrary to the silence of the central bodies of the party and notably Vladimir Putin. The subsequent appointment of Sergey Sobyanin to the head of the capital raised the question whether a mini-tandem would be needed to consolidate the Moscow branch. RFE/RL went as far as suggesting these mini-tandems would lead every single region of the country. This suggestion, as plausible as it sounds, raises some question marks. Maybe the leaders of Russia are trying to kill two birds with one stone?