2011-03-30

Us and them

In politics there are two things which can clearly indicate that an issue is very important. It's either that the elite talks way too much about it or that it keeps completely silent. The control over Russia's geopolitical orientation was something that hadn't been questioned for years and now it seems to face a long and fierce discussion. Some suggest that this stint between Medvedev and Putin is something that hadn't been seen earlier and that it is the first "real" dispute within the tandem. Some even see the end of the "dynamic duo". I don't think that the week that passed since the conflicting statements has lived up to the expectations of those who wanted to see an open rivalry. On the other hand, given the oddity of a public confrontation like this in an election year, I am sure something is going on and it is more than the usual pokazukha. Still, in Russia, these things can only be planned. But who planned this one, and what is the point?

2011-03-19

Divide et impera

Many noticed how the finance minister Aleksey Kudrin has become an interesting figure of Russian politics recently. I myself have blogged about him earlier, voicing my opinion that Kudrin might be the public face of Kremlin-style liberalisation in an attempt to safely link the "civiliki" to Putin. Now that Kudrin again voiced the need for political liberalisation at another investment forum this week, Brian Whitmore suggests that Kudrin may step into public politics as a leader of the Right Cause party. Speculations about this have been around for a while, so there is definitely something planned. Such an enigmatic person as Kudrin will probably not become, all of a sudden, a loose cannon. If it's planned though, it seems to confirm my earlier theory about the integration of the liberals under the leadership of a strong ally of Putin. But what does it mean for Putin, Medvedev and most of all, Kudrin?

2011-03-15

At crossroads

Last Sunday Russia had its last electoral test before this year's parliamentary vote, and these elections again brought some useful lessons for the governing elite. As I have argued earlier, these local votes are, more or less, always set as tests for a certain policy, governmental philosophy or future goal. I think this one was designed to show whether United Russia has the strength to maintain its lead in the State Duma in December without serious electoral fraud. Rampant rigging of the Duma election is unlikely, for it is also undesirable for the Russian elite. Most importantly because it would contradict the slow political liberalisation that the tandem and some liberals in the government seem to have embarked upon. A considerable deviation from this policy would probably mean an uncontrollable strengthening of liberals (both inside and outside the government). A third problem would be the disapproval of the West, which Russia traditionally does not care about, but which would also be problematic in view of the recent thaw in international relations. So, United Russia had to face a test, and it failed. And, oddly enough, this may hurt Medvedev more than Putin. What exactly do the results teach us? 

2011-03-02

All roads lead to the Third Rome

Is there really something happening in Russia, or are we only made to believe that? I think this is the main question that has been emerging in this election year of 2011, with a lot of arguments on both sides. On the surface, apparently, a lot of things change. Sergey Storchak is freed, the Khodorkovsky case may be revisited, and finance minister Aleksey Kudrin seems to have opened Pandora's box with his recent calling for a real political reform. Now other economists follow the lead, continuing the line started by Vladislav Surkov last year and interrupted by the "safety speech" of Dmitry Medvedev in December. Some argue that Medvedev slowly but surely started to take over the leadership in the tandem, pointing at the steadily decreasing number of siloviki in the state administration. Others say that we are witnessing a farce, the only goal of which is to maintain some kind of tension in Russian politics, so that Putin can embark on his "Plan B" if things start to get out of hands.