Changing horses

Vladislav Surkov's departure from the Kremlin has shocked many. After all, the grey cardinal has occupied the post of deputy chief of staff in charge for political engineering practically for ever (1999, to be exact). However, there had been some signs of his imminent departure (Kevin Rothrock spotted some), and while it undoubtedly signals the end of an era (just like Aleksey Kudrin's resignation did), it does not necessarily mean the end of Surkov's importance in Russia's political system. Positions change, roles do so more rarely, and I don't think that the influence of the grey cardinal will undoubtedly fade with this demotion. His future path will depend on the political constellation after the reshuffle (including Putin's return) has been fully finished. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

Rigging - numbers

Following the estimates of other Russia-watchers and the call on Twitter from Anatoly Karlin, I joined the guessing game about the amount of fraudulent votes at the 4 December Duma elections. It is worth noting that according to Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman of Vladimir Putin, irregularities accounted for a maximum of 0.5% of total votes, while opposition activists mostly put the figure to 10-15%. The general rough assumption on Twitter seemed to be around 5%. This compilation perfectly shows off the fact of rigging, and points at the most problematic regions, but gives no palpable estimates about the amount of forged votes. When making my spreadsheet, I used similar tools to those used by Andy Young on Siberian Light, but I also tried to draw more consequences from it. Here are the results.

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

Walk-ons walk off, the stage is prepared!

There you go, I could blog now, there you have it. After all, I wasn't so much wrong comparing Mikhail Prokhorov and his party to A Just Russia in 2006. They both had Evgeny Roizman, and the party in both cases went mad upon the nomination of Roizman. Both leaders suffered a humiliating demise orchestrated by the Kremlin as soon as their activities became too bold for the ruling elite. Even the columnist of Kommersant realised the apparent parallelism between the two cases I pointed out a month ago, which put light on a much greater issue. It is not sure any more whether the chief ideological workshop headed by Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin can handle Russian politics as effectively as it used to. Still, paradoxically, this emerging struggle within the ruling elite, which is far from being any striking news, may eventually lead to a more daring liberalisation of Russian politics. 

Russian chess

After a long summer recess, partly spent in Russia to monitor the general pre-election mood, I have a lot to reflect on in Russian politics. Not so much, actually. The summer months have been filled with the ridiculously under- or overplanned depart of St. Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko to the helm of the Federation Council (which I intend to deal with later, once the circle is closed and we have a new St. Petersburg governor, likely Dmitry Kozak), as well as the almost equally bumpy organisation of both the All Russia People's Front and Right Cause. This latter is also worth attention, as the transformation of the party system is a strong indicator of what changes might be going on under the surface. The most important question for the moment seems to be what exactly Mikhail Prokhorov is meant for, what is he good for, and whom does he represent. As there have been a lot of confusion surrounding this topic, leading to excellent, but mostly mutually contradicting analyses, I decided to present my own take on the matter, trying to show why I think Right Cause is just another dispensable tool (however fancy it is) and is not meant to be some serious political attempt in the elite's hands. 

A new pluralism

There you have it. As I blogged last week, Dmitry Medvedev seems to have moved towards the reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections. At least, this is what the President's latest statements suggest. Also, the effective removal of Valentina Matvienko from the position of St. Petersburg governor seems to confirm the idea that a thorough (if only virtual) revamp of the system of the regional administration is planned. Matviyenko's dismissal has been cooking for some time now (for the exact same reasons as in the case of Yuriy Luzhkov and Georgy Boos), but she was apparently more clever than the former Moscow mayor, and - after some "waffling" - accepted a position that is officially higher than her previous one (and which, without any doubts, has been offered to Luzhkov as well). There are still a lot of questions unanswered - including that of the person who will take over Matvienko's seat in August - but the way that Medvedev seems to be going is clear, and this can only indicate that the President is slowly but surely forming his electoral programme.