Changing horses

Vladislav Surkov's departure from the Kremlin has shocked many. After all, the grey cardinal has occupied the post of deputy chief of staff in charge for political engineering practically for ever (1999, to be exact). However, there had been some signs of his imminent departure (Kevin Rothrock spotted some), and while it undoubtedly signals the end of an era (just like Aleksey Kudrin's resignation did), it does not necessarily mean the end of Surkov's importance in Russia's political system. Positions change, roles do so more rarely, and I don't think that the influence of the grey cardinal will undoubtedly fade with this demotion. His future path will depend on the political constellation after the reshuffle (including Putin's return) has been fully finished. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

Rigging - numbers

Following the estimates of other Russia-watchers and the call on Twitter from Anatoly Karlin, I joined the guessing game about the amount of fraudulent votes at the 4 December Duma elections. It is worth noting that according to Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman of Vladimir Putin, irregularities accounted for a maximum of 0.5% of total votes, while opposition activists mostly put the figure to 10-15%. The general rough assumption on Twitter seemed to be around 5%. This compilation perfectly shows off the fact of rigging, and points at the most problematic regions, but gives no palpable estimates about the amount of forged votes. When making my spreadsheet, I used similar tools to those used by Andy Young on Siberian Light, but I also tried to draw more consequences from it. Here are the results.

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

Walk-ons walk off, the stage is prepared!

There you go, I could blog now, there you have it. After all, I wasn't so much wrong comparing Mikhail Prokhorov and his party to A Just Russia in 2006. They both had Evgeny Roizman, and the party in both cases went mad upon the nomination of Roizman. Both leaders suffered a humiliating demise orchestrated by the Kremlin as soon as their activities became too bold for the ruling elite. Even the columnist of Kommersant realised the apparent parallelism between the two cases I pointed out a month ago, which put light on a much greater issue. It is not sure any more whether the chief ideological workshop headed by Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin can handle Russian politics as effectively as it used to. Still, paradoxically, this emerging struggle within the ruling elite, which is far from being any striking news, may eventually lead to a more daring liberalisation of Russian politics. 

Russian chess

After a long summer recess, partly spent in Russia to monitor the general pre-election mood, I have a lot to reflect on in Russian politics. Not so much, actually. The summer months have been filled with the ridiculously under- or overplanned depart of St. Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko to the helm of the Federation Council (which I intend to deal with later, once the circle is closed and we have a new St. Petersburg governor, likely Dmitry Kozak), as well as the almost equally bumpy organisation of both the All Russia People's Front and Right Cause. This latter is also worth attention, as the transformation of the party system is a strong indicator of what changes might be going on under the surface. The most important question for the moment seems to be what exactly Mikhail Prokhorov is meant for, what is he good for, and whom does he represent. As there have been a lot of confusion surrounding this topic, leading to excellent, but mostly mutually contradicting analyses, I decided to present my own take on the matter, trying to show why I think Right Cause is just another dispensable tool (however fancy it is) and is not meant to be some serious political attempt in the elite's hands. 

A new pluralism

There you have it. As I blogged last week, Dmitry Medvedev seems to have moved towards the reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections. At least, this is what the President's latest statements suggest. Also, the effective removal of Valentina Matvienko from the position of St. Petersburg governor seems to confirm the idea that a thorough (if only virtual) revamp of the system of the regional administration is planned. Matviyenko's dismissal has been cooking for some time now (for the exact same reasons as in the case of Yuriy Luzhkov and Georgy Boos), but she was apparently more clever than the former Moscow mayor, and - after some "waffling" - accepted a position that is officially higher than her previous one (and which, without any doubts, has been offered to Luzhkov as well). There are still a lot of questions unanswered - including that of the person who will take over Matvienko's seat in August - but the way that Medvedev seems to be going is clear, and this can only indicate that the President is slowly but surely forming his electoral programme.

Genius loci

After a long pre-summer recess, I finally have the time to react on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and especially on the speech given by Dmitry Medvedev. The President's intervention lasted slightly more than 30 minutes, contrary to the much hyped press conference in May that stretched on for more than 2 hours. Yet, I dare to say, this speech was the strongest indication so far that Medvedev wants to retain power and he is willing to give the ruling elite tangible reasons why he should be the candidate next year. It was also an important contribution to the debate about the the revamp of the Russian political and economic system, a notion that Medvedev pretty much seems to have embarked on and will make it the core of his campaign. In the following paragraphs, I'll try to argue why the St. Petersburg speech had a considerable significance in view of the forthcoming elections and what it has to do with some other exciting analytic material Russia-watchers could lay their hands on during the last couple of weeks. 

Who needs a punchline?

I was really surprised to see how many journalists and Russia-watchers said that Wednesday's press conference in Skolkovo had turned out to be a disappointment. To me it was not the least bit disappointing. On the contrary, it was damn interesting to watch. Oh, sorry: did anyone really expect a big announcement? I hope not. As Medvedev rightly put it, the time is not ripe yet. Moreover, clearly, Medvedev cannot announce his candidacy before a capable political force announces that it would support it. And this way, the President's candidacy might as well be announced by the All-Russia People's Front, even if Medvedev again used the word "Я" repeatedly in his sentence when asked about the big announcement. Meanwhile, he did drop quite a few interesting sentences about "the next government", Mikhail Hodorkovsky, or the demise of Sergey Mironov. On the other hand, he didn't touch on the new leader of the Right Cause party, Mikhail Prokhorov. Was this then an act of surrendering or further window-dressing?

Nothing new under the Sun

The title may seem surprising. There has indeed been a lot of news recently in Russian politics, so much that it got a considerable part of us Russia-watchers confused. Gleb Pavlovsky quit, Medvedev started to replace officials on the boards of state-owned companies, a massive reorganisation has taken place in the police, the President started a legislative upsurge against corruption, a real chance emerged to revisit the case of Sergey Magnitsky, and, most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a wide political alliance of parties, people and civil organisations who are ready to rally around United Russia. Some, including the very respectable Gordon Hahn on ROPV, suggest that this may be the sign of a real rupture on the highest levels of the ruling tandem. I agree with most of his points, but when it comes to drawing conclusions, we differ. I don't think this is the beginning of an open war at the top. Here is why.

They want change

Changes in Russian politics seem to have gained momentum in March. Things follow each other in a remarkable pace, public dispute about Libya followed by the massive sacking of government officials from the boards of state-owned companies and Dmitry Medvedev's most straightforward ever indication about his running for presidency in 2012. Even well-informed Russian political commentators are scratching their heads clueless, while the only consensus seems to be on the fact that something is really happening (which, by the way, should come as no surprise, given that 2011 is an election year). Obviously, I won't try to do justice from Brussels, but I will add what I think about the whole story, and what I think may be in stock for us. So is this one a real conflict, and what seem to be the strategies of the conflicting (or the cooperating) parties?

Us and them

In politics there are two things which can clearly indicate that an issue is very important. It's either that the elite talks way too much about it or that it keeps completely silent. The control over Russia's geopolitical orientation was something that hadn't been questioned for years and now it seems to face a long and fierce discussion. Some suggest that this stint between Medvedev and Putin is something that hadn't been seen earlier and that it is the first "real" dispute within the tandem. Some even see the end of the "dynamic duo". I don't think that the week that passed since the conflicting statements has lived up to the expectations of those who wanted to see an open rivalry. On the other hand, given the oddity of a public confrontation like this in an election year, I am sure something is going on and it is more than the usual pokazukha. Still, in Russia, these things can only be planned. But who planned this one, and what is the point?

Divide et impera

Many noticed how the finance minister Aleksey Kudrin has become an interesting figure of Russian politics recently. I myself have blogged about him earlier, voicing my opinion that Kudrin might be the public face of Kremlin-style liberalisation in an attempt to safely link the "civiliki" to Putin. Now that Kudrin again voiced the need for political liberalisation at another investment forum this week, Brian Whitmore suggests that Kudrin may step into public politics as a leader of the Right Cause party. Speculations about this have been around for a while, so there is definitely something planned. Such an enigmatic person as Kudrin will probably not become, all of a sudden, a loose cannon. If it's planned though, it seems to confirm my earlier theory about the integration of the liberals under the leadership of a strong ally of Putin. But what does it mean for Putin, Medvedev and most of all, Kudrin?

At crossroads

Last Sunday Russia had its last electoral test before this year's parliamentary vote, and these elections again brought some useful lessons for the governing elite. As I have argued earlier, these local votes are, more or less, always set as tests for a certain policy, governmental philosophy or future goal. I think this one was designed to show whether United Russia has the strength to maintain its lead in the State Duma in December without serious electoral fraud. Rampant rigging of the Duma election is unlikely, for it is also undesirable for the Russian elite. Most importantly because it would contradict the slow political liberalisation that the tandem and some liberals in the government seem to have embarked upon. A considerable deviation from this policy would probably mean an uncontrollable strengthening of liberals (both inside and outside the government). A third problem would be the disapproval of the West, which Russia traditionally does not care about, but which would also be problematic in view of the recent thaw in international relations. So, United Russia had to face a test, and it failed. And, oddly enough, this may hurt Medvedev more than Putin. What exactly do the results teach us? 

All roads lead to the Third Rome

Is there really something happening in Russia, or are we only made to believe that? I think this is the main question that has been emerging in this election year of 2011, with a lot of arguments on both sides. On the surface, apparently, a lot of things change. Sergey Storchak is freed, the Khodorkovsky case may be revisited, and finance minister Aleksey Kudrin seems to have opened Pandora's box with his recent calling for a real political reform. Now other economists follow the lead, continuing the line started by Vladislav Surkov last year and interrupted by the "safety speech" of Dmitry Medvedev in December. Some argue that Medvedev slowly but surely started to take over the leadership in the tandem, pointing at the steadily decreasing number of siloviki in the state administration. Others say that we are witnessing a farce, the only goal of which is to maintain some kind of tension in Russian politics, so that Putin can embark on his "Plan B" if things start to get out of hands. 

Teamwork

The Domodedovo bombing has undoubtedly shaken up last week's political scene in Russia. Of course, the attack has many interpretations and many lessons to draw from. I refrain from commenting on ever-surfacing opinions that the whole terror wave in Russia was in fact orchestrated by some murky state structures to allow a tighter grip on regions and further disrespect of human rights. A sober assessment dissmisses these assumptions. In fact, the aftermath of the attack is much more interesting from our point of view than the question of the whodunit. The actions taken by President Medvedev seem to confirm our point made earlier about the safe game we are likely to see this year before the election. Other than that, it will be interesting to see how all the questions put by the growing threat of terror will shape Russian politics only a bit more than a year before the presidential election. And also, who will solve them. 

Press test

After a holiday break, unfortunately longer than expected, we are back to continue dwelling on the question that, by all chances, will be solved this year. The last month of 2010 was overwhelming with politically significant events, and I am sure that the relative calmness of the first half of January can only be explained by the festive season. The most notable phenomenon in december was the quick setback of political liberalisation after the infamously and unexpectedly weird state-of-the-nation address of President Medvedev. The track of the events was obvious: a smashing interview with Putin (as usual), then the second sentence on Khodorkovsky, then the arrest of opposition activists. Can we expect yet another turnaround in 2011?