Putin's pillars

We're edging closer to the 4th of March, and accordingly, the picture has started to be clearer about the strategy of the ruling elite for the very day of the election. However, what will happen after remains a big question mark to many - not only us Russia-watchers, but, I dare to say, to many in the Kremlin as well. The events of the last few months seem to have excluded the possibility of an intentionally harsh crackdown but at the same time, a two-round scenario also seems to be less and less likely. While there is a certain logic behind Putin's apparent intention to bury his head in the sand and to proceed as usual, this may after all send the wrong signal to the elite and certainly to the population. Putin surely thinks that he chose the safer strategy, but this might as well turn out to be the riskier one. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

A new pluralism

There you have it. As I blogged last week, Dmitry Medvedev seems to have moved towards the reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections. At least, this is what the President's latest statements suggest. Also, the effective removal of Valentina Matvienko from the position of St. Petersburg governor seems to confirm the idea that a thorough (if only virtual) revamp of the system of the regional administration is planned. Matviyenko's dismissal has been cooking for some time now (for the exact same reasons as in the case of Yuriy Luzhkov and Georgy Boos), but she was apparently more clever than the former Moscow mayor, and - after some "waffling" - accepted a position that is officially higher than her previous one (and which, without any doubts, has been offered to Luzhkov as well). There are still a lot of questions unanswered - including that of the person who will take over Matvienko's seat in August - but the way that Medvedev seems to be going is clear, and this can only indicate that the President is slowly but surely forming his electoral programme.

How to fix a crack

Quite understandably, there has been a lot of hype around the replacement of Yuri Luzhkov. United Russia announced the list of candidates on 11 October. That means that Dmitry Medvedev will choose one of them by Monday. Or will it be one? Brian Whitmore on RFE/RL convincingly argues that the ruling tandem is about to reproduce the same structure in the capital, putting an "executive" premier under the future mayor. I cannot but agree with the obious benefits of a structure like that, and I must also take note of the very cautious approach Russian leaders have been handling this problem with. However, I have some reservations about the lineup the article suggests.

Dima's last chance

Bang! The news about the sudden and arbitrary dismissal of Moscow mayor Yury Luzhkov came today as a lightning struck – to everyone that had not been following Russian politics in the last few years. In fact, this step was so exactly predicted by political commentators and Kremlinologists throughout the planet, that one might even have a slight suspicion that the tech-savvy Dmitry Medvedev took his decision after reading numerous blog entries predicting that the autumn of 2010 was indeed the last opportunity for the President to fire this political Methuselah. Whichever way Medvedev took his decision this also marks the beginning of the 2012 showdown. Luzhkov, commonly referred to as the “third man” in Russia after Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, will leave a complicated legacy to deal with.