The Putin Defence

Obviously, the biggest question when it comes to the new power structure in Russia will be about the handling of inevitable personal clashes. As I've blogged before, Vladimir Putin will have to solve a double task: he will have to ensure stability for the elite that takes stability for the preservation of the monolithic power structures, while at the same time ensuring stability for the population that takes stability for the return of stable growth. As a third factor, Putin will also have to deal with those who want change, and who may as well be more powerful than Putin has anticipated. Especially now that we're closing in on regional elections. I suppose that Putin will try to put in place a system where, in the short term, he will be trying to keep heavyweights out of the frontline and push a semblance of changes to the foreground. This might allow him to buy precious time, but it won't be near enough to preserve a system which is more and more decaying from below. 

Back to the future

It might seem as if the game had ended - at least this is what Novaya Gazeta proclaimed on its front page this week. In fact, the "game" has only just begun with last Sunday's victory of Putin. I believe that in a way Putin's third term will be more reminiscent to Medvedev's intermezzo than to Putin's first two presidential mandates. The elected president may have cleared an important checkpoint - smoother than many had expected - but he still has to face a more important, and tougher challenge: dismantling and redesigning a system he created, while avoiding potential loss of trust from either side of the elite. Thus, he has to create a new power balance, a new machinery and a new way of deliberation to run the state, a new popular platform and he has to do it so to be able to conduct the necessary economic and political reforms as efficiently as possible. The mortar of the system has already been eroded by the unorthodox circumstances under Medvedev, and the next couple of months will be decisive from the point of view of laying out the blueprint for a new, stable, but more flexible construction. But how will this look like?

Putin's pillars

We're edging closer to the 4th of March, and accordingly, the picture has started to be clearer about the strategy of the ruling elite for the very day of the election. However, what will happen after remains a big question mark to many - not only us Russia-watchers, but, I dare to say, to many in the Kremlin as well. The events of the last few months seem to have excluded the possibility of an intentionally harsh crackdown but at the same time, a two-round scenario also seems to be less and less likely. While there is a certain logic behind Putin's apparent intention to bury his head in the sand and to proceed as usual, this may after all send the wrong signal to the elite and certainly to the population. Putin surely thinks that he chose the safer strategy, but this might as well turn out to be the riskier one. 

Changing horses

Vladislav Surkov's departure from the Kremlin has shocked many. After all, the grey cardinal has occupied the post of deputy chief of staff in charge for political engineering practically for ever (1999, to be exact). However, there had been some signs of his imminent departure (Kevin Rothrock spotted some), and while it undoubtedly signals the end of an era (just like Aleksey Kudrin's resignation did), it does not necessarily mean the end of Surkov's importance in Russia's political system. Positions change, roles do so more rarely, and I don't think that the influence of the grey cardinal will undoubtedly fade with this demotion. His future path will depend on the political constellation after the reshuffle (including Putin's return) has been fully finished. 

Nothing new under the Sun

The title may seem surprising. There has indeed been a lot of news recently in Russian politics, so much that it got a considerable part of us Russia-watchers confused. Gleb Pavlovsky quit, Medvedev started to replace officials on the boards of state-owned companies, a massive reorganisation has taken place in the police, the President started a legislative upsurge against corruption, a real chance emerged to revisit the case of Sergey Magnitsky, and, most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a wide political alliance of parties, people and civil organisations who are ready to rally around United Russia. Some, including the very respectable Gordon Hahn on ROPV, suggest that this may be the sign of a real rupture on the highest levels of the ruling tandem. I agree with most of his points, but when it comes to drawing conclusions, we differ. I don't think this is the beginning of an open war at the top. Here is why.

All roads lead to the Third Rome

Is there really something happening in Russia, or are we only made to believe that? I think this is the main question that has been emerging in this election year of 2011, with a lot of arguments on both sides. On the surface, apparently, a lot of things change. Sergey Storchak is freed, the Khodorkovsky case may be revisited, and finance minister Aleksey Kudrin seems to have opened Pandora's box with his recent calling for a real political reform. Now other economists follow the lead, continuing the line started by Vladislav Surkov last year and interrupted by the "safety speech" of Dmitry Medvedev in December. Some argue that Medvedev slowly but surely started to take over the leadership in the tandem, pointing at the steadily decreasing number of siloviki in the state administration. Others say that we are witnessing a farce, the only goal of which is to maintain some kind of tension in Russian politics, so that Putin can embark on his "Plan B" if things start to get out of hands. 

Teamwork

The Domodedovo bombing has undoubtedly shaken up last week's political scene in Russia. Of course, the attack has many interpretations and many lessons to draw from. I refrain from commenting on ever-surfacing opinions that the whole terror wave in Russia was in fact orchestrated by some murky state structures to allow a tighter grip on regions and further disrespect of human rights. A sober assessment dissmisses these assumptions. In fact, the aftermath of the attack is much more interesting from our point of view than the question of the whodunit. The actions taken by President Medvedev seem to confirm our point made earlier about the safe game we are likely to see this year before the election. Other than that, it will be interesting to see how all the questions put by the growing threat of terror will shape Russian politics only a bit more than a year before the presidential election. And also, who will solve them. 

Press test

After a holiday break, unfortunately longer than expected, we are back to continue dwelling on the question that, by all chances, will be solved this year. The last month of 2010 was overwhelming with politically significant events, and I am sure that the relative calmness of the first half of January can only be explained by the festive season. The most notable phenomenon in december was the quick setback of political liberalisation after the infamously and unexpectedly weird state-of-the-nation address of President Medvedev. The track of the events was obvious: a smashing interview with Putin (as usual), then the second sentence on Khodorkovsky, then the arrest of opposition activists. Can we expect yet another turnaround in 2011?