Putin's pillars

We're edging closer to the 4th of March, and accordingly, the picture has started to be clearer about the strategy of the ruling elite for the very day of the election. However, what will happen after remains a big question mark to many - not only us Russia-watchers, but, I dare to say, to many in the Kremlin as well. The events of the last few months seem to have excluded the possibility of an intentionally harsh crackdown but at the same time, a two-round scenario also seems to be less and less likely. While there is a certain logic behind Putin's apparent intention to bury his head in the sand and to proceed as usual, this may after all send the wrong signal to the elite and certainly to the population. Putin surely thinks that he chose the safer strategy, but this might as well turn out to be the riskier one. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

Rigging - numbers

Following the estimates of other Russia-watchers and the call on Twitter from Anatoly Karlin, I joined the guessing game about the amount of fraudulent votes at the 4 December Duma elections. It is worth noting that according to Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman of Vladimir Putin, irregularities accounted for a maximum of 0.5% of total votes, while opposition activists mostly put the figure to 10-15%. The general rough assumption on Twitter seemed to be around 5%. This compilation perfectly shows off the fact of rigging, and points at the most problematic regions, but gives no palpable estimates about the amount of forged votes. When making my spreadsheet, I used similar tools to those used by Andy Young on Siberian Light, but I also tried to draw more consequences from it. Here are the results.

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

At crossroads

Last Sunday Russia had its last electoral test before this year's parliamentary vote, and these elections again brought some useful lessons for the governing elite. As I have argued earlier, these local votes are, more or less, always set as tests for a certain policy, governmental philosophy or future goal. I think this one was designed to show whether United Russia has the strength to maintain its lead in the State Duma in December without serious electoral fraud. Rampant rigging of the Duma election is unlikely, for it is also undesirable for the Russian elite. Most importantly because it would contradict the slow political liberalisation that the tandem and some liberals in the government seem to have embarked upon. A considerable deviation from this policy would probably mean an uncontrollable strengthening of liberals (both inside and outside the government). A third problem would be the disapproval of the West, which Russia traditionally does not care about, but which would also be problematic in view of the recent thaw in international relations. So, United Russia had to face a test, and it failed. And, oddly enough, this may hurt Medvedev more than Putin. What exactly do the results teach us? 

Equal opportunities

Two quite strange and surprising news items hit the internet last week. The first was about the odd "injury" of Vladimir Putin, seen during his trip to Ukraine, which was described by official sources as a symptom of jet lag and exhaustion. Jet lag would of course be understandable, but "exhaustion" is a very weak explanation in the case of a man who has long since been styled and shown as the toughest guy in Russia. I doubt we find out someday what exactly was behind that mark, but let's dwell on that later. The other thing did not get this much media attention. According to Levada Center, the approval ratings of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, for the first time in history, equalled. Does it mean the beginning of something new? I doubt so. Only on the surface, maybe.