The Putin Defence

Obviously, the biggest question when it comes to the new power structure in Russia will be about the handling of inevitable personal clashes. As I've blogged before, Vladimir Putin will have to solve a double task: he will have to ensure stability for the elite that takes stability for the preservation of the monolithic power structures, while at the same time ensuring stability for the population that takes stability for the return of stable growth. As a third factor, Putin will also have to deal with those who want change, and who may as well be more powerful than Putin has anticipated. Especially now that we're closing in on regional elections. I suppose that Putin will try to put in place a system where, in the short term, he will be trying to keep heavyweights out of the frontline and push a semblance of changes to the foreground. This might allow him to buy precious time, but it won't be near enough to preserve a system which is more and more decaying from below. 

Spring is coming

Recent weeks in Russia, following the 10 December protest, were hallmarked by another large-scale demonstration yesterday, three important speeches (and interviews) by Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev and Aleksey Kudrin, as well as a staged scandal affecting Boris Nemtsov. These events show two main patterns of Russian politics crystallising in the aftermath of the Duma election: the general strategy of the ruling elite to divide protesters (who are indeed heterogeneous), and meanwhile to gain time by announcing a much quicker pace of reforms than previously anticipated. We should not forget, though, that we are in a transitional period, the present situation being also a prelude for the 2012 presidential election. 

Rigging - numbers

Following the estimates of other Russia-watchers and the call on Twitter from Anatoly Karlin, I joined the guessing game about the amount of fraudulent votes at the 4 December Duma elections. It is worth noting that according to Dmitry Peskov, the spokesman of Vladimir Putin, irregularities accounted for a maximum of 0.5% of total votes, while opposition activists mostly put the figure to 10-15%. The general rough assumption on Twitter seemed to be around 5%. This compilation perfectly shows off the fact of rigging, and points at the most problematic regions, but gives no palpable estimates about the amount of forged votes. When making my spreadsheet, I used similar tools to those used by Andy Young on Siberian Light, but I also tried to draw more consequences from it. Here are the results.

The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

Walk-ons walk off, the stage is prepared!

There you go, I could blog now, there you have it. After all, I wasn't so much wrong comparing Mikhail Prokhorov and his party to A Just Russia in 2006. They both had Evgeny Roizman, and the party in both cases went mad upon the nomination of Roizman. Both leaders suffered a humiliating demise orchestrated by the Kremlin as soon as their activities became too bold for the ruling elite. Even the columnist of Kommersant realised the apparent parallelism between the two cases I pointed out a month ago, which put light on a much greater issue. It is not sure any more whether the chief ideological workshop headed by Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin can handle Russian politics as effectively as it used to. Still, paradoxically, this emerging struggle within the ruling elite, which is far from being any striking news, may eventually lead to a more daring liberalisation of Russian politics. 

Nothing new under the Sun

The title may seem surprising. There has indeed been a lot of news recently in Russian politics, so much that it got a considerable part of us Russia-watchers confused. Gleb Pavlovsky quit, Medvedev started to replace officials on the boards of state-owned companies, a massive reorganisation has taken place in the police, the President started a legislative upsurge against corruption, a real chance emerged to revisit the case of Sergey Magnitsky, and, most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a wide political alliance of parties, people and civil organisations who are ready to rally around United Russia. Some, including the very respectable Gordon Hahn on ROPV, suggest that this may be the sign of a real rupture on the highest levels of the ruling tandem. I agree with most of his points, but when it comes to drawing conclusions, we differ. I don't think this is the beginning of an open war at the top. Here is why.

Divide et impera

Many noticed how the finance minister Aleksey Kudrin has become an interesting figure of Russian politics recently. I myself have blogged about him earlier, voicing my opinion that Kudrin might be the public face of Kremlin-style liberalisation in an attempt to safely link the "civiliki" to Putin. Now that Kudrin again voiced the need for political liberalisation at another investment forum this week, Brian Whitmore suggests that Kudrin may step into public politics as a leader of the Right Cause party. Speculations about this have been around for a while, so there is definitely something planned. Such an enigmatic person as Kudrin will probably not become, all of a sudden, a loose cannon. If it's planned though, it seems to confirm my earlier theory about the integration of the liberals under the leadership of a strong ally of Putin. But what does it mean for Putin, Medvedev and most of all, Kudrin?

At crossroads

Last Sunday Russia had its last electoral test before this year's parliamentary vote, and these elections again brought some useful lessons for the governing elite. As I have argued earlier, these local votes are, more or less, always set as tests for a certain policy, governmental philosophy or future goal. I think this one was designed to show whether United Russia has the strength to maintain its lead in the State Duma in December without serious electoral fraud. Rampant rigging of the Duma election is unlikely, for it is also undesirable for the Russian elite. Most importantly because it would contradict the slow political liberalisation that the tandem and some liberals in the government seem to have embarked upon. A considerable deviation from this policy would probably mean an uncontrollable strengthening of liberals (both inside and outside the government). A third problem would be the disapproval of the West, which Russia traditionally does not care about, but which would also be problematic in view of the recent thaw in international relations. So, United Russia had to face a test, and it failed. And, oddly enough, this may hurt Medvedev more than Putin. What exactly do the results teach us? 

Press test

After a holiday break, unfortunately longer than expected, we are back to continue dwelling on the question that, by all chances, will be solved this year. The last month of 2010 was overwhelming with politically significant events, and I am sure that the relative calmness of the first half of January can only be explained by the festive season. The most notable phenomenon in december was the quick setback of political liberalisation after the infamously and unexpectedly weird state-of-the-nation address of President Medvedev. The track of the events was obvious: a smashing interview with Putin (as usual), then the second sentence on Khodorkovsky, then the arrest of opposition activists. Can we expect yet another turnaround in 2011?

A grain of sand

It has taken me a while to react on the disappointing state of the nation address of President Medvedev, and the reason is that for a long time I hadn't quite gotten the idea behind it. As we all remember, the whole story about the speech started out quite promisingly. There were plenty of opportunities for Medvedev to make a giant leap towards his second term. First, there were speculations about a planned reorganisation of Russia's federal subjects that would have created the geographical prerequisite for modernisation. Then, there was this carefully built up notion about a gradual political modernisation of Russia. It started in Yaroslavl then continued with the "projections" of Vladislav Surkov about the backlash of United Russia, which was echoed - albeit in a more cautious manner - by Medvedev himself (and seemingly embraced by the party as well). Then, by a sudden turn of events, the President deems it more important to speak about children's rights (besides the usual mantra). Maybe he simply had too much to talk about?

Getting from four to five

One of the most interesting statements of last week was that of the vice-chair of the President's administration, Vladislav Surkov, also known as the grey cardinal of the Kremlin. Speaking to American students, Surkov stated that United Russia has an "abnormally high" rating and that in the next few years the party will become weaker while opposition parties gain strength. Surkov went so far as to claim that in 10 years the number of parties in the State Duma will rise from the present four to five. Should anyone else say similar things, I would dismiss it as a mumbo jumbo with no adequate scientific background whatsoever. But we are in Russia, and Surkov is the main engineer of the Russian party system. So, if he makes such remarks, we might as well take them for granted. But what exactly is the goal of these changes and whose goal is it, anyway?

Modernisation, actually

This certainly began earlier, but the sacking of Yuri Luzhkov again directed the attention to the state and the future role of the United Russia party. The Moscow branch of the party was the only political organisation that openly supported Luzhkov, contrary to the silence of the central bodies of the party and notably Vladimir Putin. The subsequent appointment of Sergey Sobyanin to the head of the capital raised the question whether a mini-tandem would be needed to consolidate the Moscow branch. RFE/RL went as far as suggesting these mini-tandems would lead every single region of the country. This suggestion, as plausible as it sounds, raises some question marks. Maybe the leaders of Russia are trying to kill two birds with one stone?