Changing horses

Vladislav Surkov's departure from the Kremlin has shocked many. After all, the grey cardinal has occupied the post of deputy chief of staff in charge for political engineering practically for ever (1999, to be exact). However, there had been some signs of his imminent departure (Kevin Rothrock spotted some), and while it undoubtedly signals the end of an era (just like Aleksey Kudrin's resignation did), it does not necessarily mean the end of Surkov's importance in Russia's political system. Positions change, roles do so more rarely, and I don't think that the influence of the grey cardinal will undoubtedly fade with this demotion. His future path will depend on the political constellation after the reshuffle (including Putin's return) has been fully finished. 

Walk-ons walk off, the stage is prepared!

There you go, I could blog now, there you have it. After all, I wasn't so much wrong comparing Mikhail Prokhorov and his party to A Just Russia in 2006. They both had Evgeny Roizman, and the party in both cases went mad upon the nomination of Roizman. Both leaders suffered a humiliating demise orchestrated by the Kremlin as soon as their activities became too bold for the ruling elite. Even the columnist of Kommersant realised the apparent parallelism between the two cases I pointed out a month ago, which put light on a much greater issue. It is not sure any more whether the chief ideological workshop headed by Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin can handle Russian politics as effectively as it used to. Still, paradoxically, this emerging struggle within the ruling elite, which is far from being any striking news, may eventually lead to a more daring liberalisation of Russian politics. 

A new pluralism

There you have it. As I blogged last week, Dmitry Medvedev seems to have moved towards the reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections. At least, this is what the President's latest statements suggest. Also, the effective removal of Valentina Matvienko from the position of St. Petersburg governor seems to confirm the idea that a thorough (if only virtual) revamp of the system of the regional administration is planned. Matviyenko's dismissal has been cooking for some time now (for the exact same reasons as in the case of Yuriy Luzhkov and Georgy Boos), but she was apparently more clever than the former Moscow mayor, and - after some "waffling" - accepted a position that is officially higher than her previous one (and which, without any doubts, has been offered to Luzhkov as well). There are still a lot of questions unanswered - including that of the person who will take over Matvienko's seat in August - but the way that Medvedev seems to be going is clear, and this can only indicate that the President is slowly but surely forming his electoral programme.

Genius loci

After a long pre-summer recess, I finally have the time to react on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and especially on the speech given by Dmitry Medvedev. The President's intervention lasted slightly more than 30 minutes, contrary to the much hyped press conference in May that stretched on for more than 2 hours. Yet, I dare to say, this speech was the strongest indication so far that Medvedev wants to retain power and he is willing to give the ruling elite tangible reasons why he should be the candidate next year. It was also an important contribution to the debate about the the revamp of the Russian political and economic system, a notion that Medvedev pretty much seems to have embarked on and will make it the core of his campaign. In the following paragraphs, I'll try to argue why the St. Petersburg speech had a considerable significance in view of the forthcoming elections and what it has to do with some other exciting analytic material Russia-watchers could lay their hands on during the last couple of weeks. 

Who needs a punchline?

I was really surprised to see how many journalists and Russia-watchers said that Wednesday's press conference in Skolkovo had turned out to be a disappointment. To me it was not the least bit disappointing. On the contrary, it was damn interesting to watch. Oh, sorry: did anyone really expect a big announcement? I hope not. As Medvedev rightly put it, the time is not ripe yet. Moreover, clearly, Medvedev cannot announce his candidacy before a capable political force announces that it would support it. And this way, the President's candidacy might as well be announced by the All-Russia People's Front, even if Medvedev again used the word "Я" repeatedly in his sentence when asked about the big announcement. Meanwhile, he did drop quite a few interesting sentences about "the next government", Mikhail Hodorkovsky, or the demise of Sergey Mironov. On the other hand, he didn't touch on the new leader of the Right Cause party, Mikhail Prokhorov. Was this then an act of surrendering or further window-dressing?

Nothing new under the Sun

The title may seem surprising. There has indeed been a lot of news recently in Russian politics, so much that it got a considerable part of us Russia-watchers confused. Gleb Pavlovsky quit, Medvedev started to replace officials on the boards of state-owned companies, a massive reorganisation has taken place in the police, the President started a legislative upsurge against corruption, a real chance emerged to revisit the case of Sergey Magnitsky, and, most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a wide political alliance of parties, people and civil organisations who are ready to rally around United Russia. Some, including the very respectable Gordon Hahn on ROPV, suggest that this may be the sign of a real rupture on the highest levels of the ruling tandem. I agree with most of his points, but when it comes to drawing conclusions, we differ. I don't think this is the beginning of an open war at the top. Here is why.

They want change

Changes in Russian politics seem to have gained momentum in March. Things follow each other in a remarkable pace, public dispute about Libya followed by the massive sacking of government officials from the boards of state-owned companies and Dmitry Medvedev's most straightforward ever indication about his running for presidency in 2012. Even well-informed Russian political commentators are scratching their heads clueless, while the only consensus seems to be on the fact that something is really happening (which, by the way, should come as no surprise, given that 2011 is an election year). Obviously, I won't try to do justice from Brussels, but I will add what I think about the whole story, and what I think may be in stock for us. So is this one a real conflict, and what seem to be the strategies of the conflicting (or the cooperating) parties?

Us and them

In politics there are two things which can clearly indicate that an issue is very important. It's either that the elite talks way too much about it or that it keeps completely silent. The control over Russia's geopolitical orientation was something that hadn't been questioned for years and now it seems to face a long and fierce discussion. Some suggest that this stint between Medvedev and Putin is something that hadn't been seen earlier and that it is the first "real" dispute within the tandem. Some even see the end of the "dynamic duo". I don't think that the week that passed since the conflicting statements has lived up to the expectations of those who wanted to see an open rivalry. On the other hand, given the oddity of a public confrontation like this in an election year, I am sure something is going on and it is more than the usual pokazukha. Still, in Russia, these things can only be planned. But who planned this one, and what is the point?

Teamwork

The Domodedovo bombing has undoubtedly shaken up last week's political scene in Russia. Of course, the attack has many interpretations and many lessons to draw from. I refrain from commenting on ever-surfacing opinions that the whole terror wave in Russia was in fact orchestrated by some murky state structures to allow a tighter grip on regions and further disrespect of human rights. A sober assessment dissmisses these assumptions. In fact, the aftermath of the attack is much more interesting from our point of view than the question of the whodunit. The actions taken by President Medvedev seem to confirm our point made earlier about the safe game we are likely to see this year before the election. Other than that, it will be interesting to see how all the questions put by the growing threat of terror will shape Russian politics only a bit more than a year before the presidential election. And also, who will solve them. 

Press test

After a holiday break, unfortunately longer than expected, we are back to continue dwelling on the question that, by all chances, will be solved this year. The last month of 2010 was overwhelming with politically significant events, and I am sure that the relative calmness of the first half of January can only be explained by the festive season. The most notable phenomenon in december was the quick setback of political liberalisation after the infamously and unexpectedly weird state-of-the-nation address of President Medvedev. The track of the events was obvious: a smashing interview with Putin (as usual), then the second sentence on Khodorkovsky, then the arrest of opposition activists. Can we expect yet another turnaround in 2011?

A grain of sand

It has taken me a while to react on the disappointing state of the nation address of President Medvedev, and the reason is that for a long time I hadn't quite gotten the idea behind it. As we all remember, the whole story about the speech started out quite promisingly. There were plenty of opportunities for Medvedev to make a giant leap towards his second term. First, there were speculations about a planned reorganisation of Russia's federal subjects that would have created the geographical prerequisite for modernisation. Then, there was this carefully built up notion about a gradual political modernisation of Russia. It started in Yaroslavl then continued with the "projections" of Vladislav Surkov about the backlash of United Russia, which was echoed - albeit in a more cautious manner - by Medvedev himself (and seemingly embraced by the party as well). Then, by a sudden turn of events, the President deems it more important to speak about children's rights (besides the usual mantra). Maybe he simply had too much to talk about?

Getting from four to five

One of the most interesting statements of last week was that of the vice-chair of the President's administration, Vladislav Surkov, also known as the grey cardinal of the Kremlin. Speaking to American students, Surkov stated that United Russia has an "abnormally high" rating and that in the next few years the party will become weaker while opposition parties gain strength. Surkov went so far as to claim that in 10 years the number of parties in the State Duma will rise from the present four to five. Should anyone else say similar things, I would dismiss it as a mumbo jumbo with no adequate scientific background whatsoever. But we are in Russia, and Surkov is the main engineer of the Russian party system. So, if he makes such remarks, we might as well take them for granted. But what exactly is the goal of these changes and whose goal is it, anyway?

Potemstroika

I completely agree with the thoughts of Ivan Rodin published in the Nezavisimaya Gazeta about the PR-stunt of Dmitry Medvedev, or, more specifically, his team. For those who do not know about it: the Russian President vetoed a law that would have banned people already undergoing proceedings for disorderly behaviour from organising protest rallies. This was Medvedev's third veto overall, and the first "real" one, given that the first two was put on laws containing technical problems or wording mistakes. One thing is undoubtedly clear about this story: it is not about the freedom of assembly or the rights of the opposition. The State Duma is most likely to change the wording of the law a tiny bit and then to send it back to the President. If not, Russia's government will still have plenty of tools in its hands to supress voices criticising the system too loudly. Period. However, the whole media attention surrounding the veto, the fact that this is one in a recent series of similar measures and the obscurity around the veto's birth make this usual PR-stunt a very interesting thing to observe. 

Equal opportunities

Two quite strange and surprising news items hit the internet last week. The first was about the odd "injury" of Vladimir Putin, seen during his trip to Ukraine, which was described by official sources as a symptom of jet lag and exhaustion. Jet lag would of course be understandable, but "exhaustion" is a very weak explanation in the case of a man who has long since been styled and shown as the toughest guy in Russia. I doubt we find out someday what exactly was behind that mark, but let's dwell on that later. The other thing did not get this much media attention. According to Levada Center, the approval ratings of Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, for the first time in history, equalled. Does it mean the beginning of something new? I doubt so. Only on the surface, maybe.

Modernisation, actually

This certainly began earlier, but the sacking of Yuri Luzhkov again directed the attention to the state and the future role of the United Russia party. The Moscow branch of the party was the only political organisation that openly supported Luzhkov, contrary to the silence of the central bodies of the party and notably Vladimir Putin. The subsequent appointment of Sergey Sobyanin to the head of the capital raised the question whether a mini-tandem would be needed to consolidate the Moscow branch. RFE/RL went as far as suggesting these mini-tandems would lead every single region of the country. This suggestion, as plausible as it sounds, raises some question marks. Maybe the leaders of Russia are trying to kill two birds with one stone?

Covering up

A former diplomat, one who knows Russia and its leaders quite well (I should refrain from mentioning him by name) told something very interesting and, to be honest, quite obvious (if you look at it that way) recently in Brussels. He drew my attention to the fact that Russian leaders are not completely dumb: they are fully aware that Dmitry Medvedev's top-down approach to modernisation won't make any tangible difference. The reason why they're doing this, the diplomat said, is that they want to cover something up. Something bigger, or the lack thereof.