The beginning of the end of Putin's world

"The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist." Now it seems that the greatest trick Vladimir Putin ever pulled was convincing us Russia-watchers that confident Russian voters didn't exist. Throughout the last eleven years Russian politics have become so centralised and bureaucratic, driven by a delicate equilibrium of the different siloviki and civiliki groups that most of those on the outside forgot to perceive it in any other way than what pure Kremlinology implied us to believe. But, as we have witnessed in the last couple of days, things are changing, even if it's really difficult to predict where all this is going. Thus, I choose to be careful and not entirely share the optimistic enthusiasm that I see on Twitter and among opposition activists I've met in the last few days, but I do think that some self-examination would be necessary for those who want to get straight how Russia will look like in the next years.

Walk-ons walk off, the stage is prepared!

There you go, I could blog now, there you have it. After all, I wasn't so much wrong comparing Mikhail Prokhorov and his party to A Just Russia in 2006. They both had Evgeny Roizman, and the party in both cases went mad upon the nomination of Roizman. Both leaders suffered a humiliating demise orchestrated by the Kremlin as soon as their activities became too bold for the ruling elite. Even the columnist of Kommersant realised the apparent parallelism between the two cases I pointed out a month ago, which put light on a much greater issue. It is not sure any more whether the chief ideological workshop headed by Vladislav Surkov in the Kremlin can handle Russian politics as effectively as it used to. Still, paradoxically, this emerging struggle within the ruling elite, which is far from being any striking news, may eventually lead to a more daring liberalisation of Russian politics. 

Russian chess

After a long summer recess, partly spent in Russia to monitor the general pre-election mood, I have a lot to reflect on in Russian politics. Not so much, actually. The summer months have been filled with the ridiculously under- or overplanned depart of St. Petersburg governor Valentina Matvienko to the helm of the Federation Council (which I intend to deal with later, once the circle is closed and we have a new St. Petersburg governor, likely Dmitry Kozak), as well as the almost equally bumpy organisation of both the All Russia People's Front and Right Cause. This latter is also worth attention, as the transformation of the party system is a strong indicator of what changes might be going on under the surface. The most important question for the moment seems to be what exactly Mikhail Prokhorov is meant for, what is he good for, and whom does he represent. As there have been a lot of confusion surrounding this topic, leading to excellent, but mostly mutually contradicting analyses, I decided to present my own take on the matter, trying to show why I think Right Cause is just another dispensable tool (however fancy it is) and is not meant to be some serious political attempt in the elite's hands. 

A new pluralism

There you have it. As I blogged last week, Dmitry Medvedev seems to have moved towards the reintroduction of direct gubernatorial elections. At least, this is what the President's latest statements suggest. Also, the effective removal of Valentina Matvienko from the position of St. Petersburg governor seems to confirm the idea that a thorough (if only virtual) revamp of the system of the regional administration is planned. Matviyenko's dismissal has been cooking for some time now (for the exact same reasons as in the case of Yuriy Luzhkov and Georgy Boos), but she was apparently more clever than the former Moscow mayor, and - after some "waffling" - accepted a position that is officially higher than her previous one (and which, without any doubts, has been offered to Luzhkov as well). There are still a lot of questions unanswered - including that of the person who will take over Matvienko's seat in August - but the way that Medvedev seems to be going is clear, and this can only indicate that the President is slowly but surely forming his electoral programme.

Genius loci

After a long pre-summer recess, I finally have the time to react on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and especially on the speech given by Dmitry Medvedev. The President's intervention lasted slightly more than 30 minutes, contrary to the much hyped press conference in May that stretched on for more than 2 hours. Yet, I dare to say, this speech was the strongest indication so far that Medvedev wants to retain power and he is willing to give the ruling elite tangible reasons why he should be the candidate next year. It was also an important contribution to the debate about the the revamp of the Russian political and economic system, a notion that Medvedev pretty much seems to have embarked on and will make it the core of his campaign. In the following paragraphs, I'll try to argue why the St. Petersburg speech had a considerable significance in view of the forthcoming elections and what it has to do with some other exciting analytic material Russia-watchers could lay their hands on during the last couple of weeks. 

Who needs a punchline?

I was really surprised to see how many journalists and Russia-watchers said that Wednesday's press conference in Skolkovo had turned out to be a disappointment. To me it was not the least bit disappointing. On the contrary, it was damn interesting to watch. Oh, sorry: did anyone really expect a big announcement? I hope not. As Medvedev rightly put it, the time is not ripe yet. Moreover, clearly, Medvedev cannot announce his candidacy before a capable political force announces that it would support it. And this way, the President's candidacy might as well be announced by the All-Russia People's Front, even if Medvedev again used the word "Я" repeatedly in his sentence when asked about the big announcement. Meanwhile, he did drop quite a few interesting sentences about "the next government", Mikhail Hodorkovsky, or the demise of Sergey Mironov. On the other hand, he didn't touch on the new leader of the Right Cause party, Mikhail Prokhorov. Was this then an act of surrendering or further window-dressing?

Nothing new under the Sun

The title may seem surprising. There has indeed been a lot of news recently in Russian politics, so much that it got a considerable part of us Russia-watchers confused. Gleb Pavlovsky quit, Medvedev started to replace officials on the boards of state-owned companies, a massive reorganisation has taken place in the police, the President started a legislative upsurge against corruption, a real chance emerged to revisit the case of Sergey Magnitsky, and, most recently, Vladimir Putin announced the creation of a wide political alliance of parties, people and civil organisations who are ready to rally around United Russia. Some, including the very respectable Gordon Hahn on ROPV, suggest that this may be the sign of a real rupture on the highest levels of the ruling tandem. I agree with most of his points, but when it comes to drawing conclusions, we differ. I don't think this is the beginning of an open war at the top. Here is why.